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WHAT THE COURTS ARE DOING TO STAMP OUT
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
By STANLEY B. HOUCK

Chairmanof Committee on Unauthorized Practiceof the
Law of the American Bar Association
ITHIN recent months, with respect to the acts and
activities, legal in nature and character, of those not
licensed to practice law:
(1)
The substantive law, while applied somewhat
more frequently than heretofore, has been applied without
particularly startling or novel results to the situations presented to the courts as they have normally developed.
(2) The irregular, not to say unprofessional, conduct
of attorneys advising, facilitating, or participating in such
acts, has been vigorously condemned by the courts, and the
gross impropriety of such conduct has been emphasized and,
in some cases, punished.
(3)
The technique of procedure in proceedings to present such acts to the courts for appropriate action had been
made more direct and much more simple, logical and sensible.
(4) The nature of the judicial function, in respect to
all such matters and conditions, has been, for the first time,
accurately and clearly expressed and determined; and the significance and effect thereof upon the suitable administration
of justice and upon the broad public interest has been more
truly recognized and more effectively translated into effective
action.
Otherwise expressed, the judicial function and its agents,
the judiciary, have been noticeably invigorated, spurred and
inspired to action, and caused to recognize an affirmative instead of a merely negative duty toward the whole problem.
In the decided cases, there has been reflected and expressed
the gradually gathering ultimate effect and significance of limited applications of substantive principles, and an accumulative recognition that more simple and direct procedural methods are necessary and wholly appropriate.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, January
30, 1935, in response to questions propounded by an order
of the General Court (the legislature) of Massachusetts, said:
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"It is inherent in the judicial department of government under
the constitution to control the practice of the law * * *
The judicial department can not be circumscribed or restricted
in the performance of these duties. * * * Permission to practice law is within the exclusive cognizance of the judicial
department."
More elaborately expressed in general outline, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island has summarized the nature of
the judicial function as follows:
"Under our system of law the most effective guaranty of equal

justice to all in the commonwealth is a competent and learned bar

composed of men of high personal character who govern their professional conduct at all times by the well known and generally accepted
canons of legal ethics. The lack of such a bar, or the co-existence with
it of an array of individuals or groups operating under deceptive devices
and catch-names to mislead the public into the belief that they are
entrusting their causes to those learned in the law and competent to
serve them, would inevitably result in a deprivation of justice to many
in the state. In such an atmosphere, there would be a strong tendency
for the bar to sink to the level of its unauthorized and unqualified
competitors."

In this article it will not be possible to detail all that the
courts have done recently. Only the more striking-perhaps
not even the more important-things will be referred to.
The activities of automobile associations have been thoroughly considered and the restraint imposed upon their activities has been most sweeping and far-reaching. The most
recent case, which in nowise recedes from the earlier cases, was
decided March 18, 1936 by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in State, ex rel. Attorney General v. Carolina Motor
Club Incorporated and American Automobile Association.
Antedating this case were: Goodman v. The Motorists' Alliance, 29 0. N. P. 31; Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association (R. I.), 179 A. 139, decided May
9, 1935, and People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Chicago Motor Club (Ill.), 199 N. E. 1, decided October 14,
1935.
These cases, in effect, forbid such associations to render
any legal service whatsoever or to furnish attorneys for their
members, including such services in criminal prosecutions for
negligence or manslaughter while in the operation of a motor

DICTA

271

vehicle, or for a violation of state law, town or city ordinance
concerning the operation of such vehicles, the furnishing of
counsel to bring suit free of charge to collect damages or to
defend the member against such suits and the furnishing of
consultation and free legal advice to the members of his family, his agent, servant or employe, in matters relating to the
use, operation, ownership, licensing and transfer of motor
vehicles.
Practice of law by laymen in workmen's compensation
and industrial commission cases has been broadly enjoined
and completely restricted by lower court decisions in Michigan
and Oklahoma. An undecided case raising every phase of the
question is pending before the Supreme Court of Illinois.
February 26, 1936, the Supreme Court of Ohio, in Goodman
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 130 Ohio State 427, rendered a partially unsatisfactory opinion when it permitted
laymen, such as representatives of the employer or representatives of an organization to which a claimant may belong,
"to assist an injured or deceased workman, or his dependents,
in the submission of a claim." The court stated: "Such
usually simple services are, for the most part, performed in an
expeditious and satisfactory manner. In our judgment, this
is not the practice of law; but in so holding it is neither our
intention nor purpose to modify the definition of the practice
of law announced in the first paragraph of the syllabus of
Land Title Abstract and Trust Company v. Dworken, 129
Ohio State 23, 193 N. E. 650. Of course, exceptional cases
may arise from time to time where legal problems are involved
in the presentation of claims, but it is the ordinary claim and
not the exceptional one which now engages our attention."
The court concludes: "Our conclusion is that appearances
and practice before the Industrial Commission do not ordinarily .orproperly constitute the practice of law up to the time
when a claimant first receives notice of the disallowance of his
claim under Section 1465-90, G. C., and are subject to the
regulation and control of the Industrial Commission as
granted by statute. Thereafter, rehearing proceedings before
the Commission do constitute the practice of law and must be
conducted exclusively and personally by an attorney or attorneys at law, duly admitted to practice, and the defendants are
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therefore prohibited from recognizing or entertaining representation, in the particular noted, by those failing to meet
such qualification."
Cases against banks and trust companies have recently
been almost missing from the dockets. The last decision of a
Supreme Court upon this subject is the Missouri case, State v.
St. Louis Union Trust Company (Mo.), 74 S. W. (2d)
348. Since that decision, however, a lower court in Michigan
has reached substantially the same conclusion which has been
appealed and is now pending before the Supreme Court of
Michigan; and, on January 29, 1936, the District Court of
Ellis County, Oklahoma, granted a sweeping injunction
against all unauthorized activities by Oklahoma banks.
As has been the case for some time, recently the activities
of collection agencies have held the center of the stage so far
as volume of litigation is concerned. The recent cases have
been: State Bar of Oklahoma v. Retail Credit Association
(Okla.), 37 P. (2d) 954; Depew v. Wichita Retail Credit
Association, 42 P. (2d) 214; Depew v. Wichita Association
of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P. (2d) 1041; People, ex
rel. Chicago Bar Association v. The Securities Discount Corporation, 279 Ill. App. 70; Washington State Bar Association v. Merchant's Rating and Adjustment Company
(Wash.), 49 P. (2d) 26, and a number of lower court cases,
most of which resulted in injunctions without the rendering
of an opinion. Probably the most valuable of these lower
court cases is the memorandum of Judge Frank G. Sutton, Jr.,
of Richmond, Virginia, in the Bar Association of the City of
Richmond v. The Richmond Association of Credit Men, Incorporated.
These cases have covered almost every conceivable activity of collection and similar agencies.
The action extends
from complete prohibition, as in the case of innumerable
injunctions issued in Massachusetts, to a more tolerant attitude such as is reflected in the Washington case referred to.
Perhaps the most interesting advance was made in the
last decided Kansas case. The Supreme Court of Kansas held
that it was the practice of law for the Wichita Association of
Credit Men and its principal officer, for himself and the association, to use blanks and send solicitations of proofs of claim
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and powers of attorney in bankruptcy proceedings and, holding such powers of attorney, to vote for and elect himself as
trustee in cases pending in the bankruptcy division of the Federal court; and, as trustee, to turn accounts for collection over
to the collection department of the association and pay collection fees to it for such collections, and to generally vote such
claims in the bankruptcy court and do such other things as a
holder of a power of attorney is accustomed to do. February
17, 1936, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari
in this case.
Two New York Federal district courts have adopted
very broad and sweeping rules regulating the conduct of laymen in bankruptcy proceedings. These rules particularly
have reference to solicitation of claims by laymen. It should
be said in this connection that the United States District
Court at Toledo, January 13, 1936, reached the opposite
conclusion.
Lower courts in Florida, North Dakota, and Oklahoma
have held that the preparation of a long list of legal instruments constitutes the practice of law and has forbidden specifically such activity. In North Dakota the instruments specified were: warranty deeds, real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages, satisfactions of real estate mortgages, releases of chattel
mortgages, satisfactions of judgments, conditional sales contracts, affidavits of various kinds and dealing with various
subjects, contracts for deed, sheep contracts, house leases,
labor liens, threshers' liens, mechanics' liens for material, mechanics' liens for labor, satisfactions of mechanics' liens, partial
waivers and releases of notices of intention to file mechanics'
liens, notices of intentions and demands before filing mechanics' liens, abandonment and cancellation of notices to file mechanics' liens. In Florida the instruments mentioned were:
any kind of deed or conveyance of real or personal property,
or any mortgage, lease, contract or other such like instrument
or paper relative to such property; will, codicil, option, power
of attorney, property agreement, lien, notice of lien, bond,
assignment of mortgage or contract or claim or chose in action, creditors' claims in probate, notice to vacate premises or
notice to quit or pay rent, vendor's statement of creditors
under the bulk sales law, articles of incorporation or charter.
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In Oklahoma the inhibited documents were: chattel mortgages, contracts of real estate mortgage, deeds, wills, trust
agreements, escrow agreements; and the prohibition included
the acts whether "for or without pay or any promised remuneration," and specified "that the filling in of printed blanks
of a legal nature is of the same effect as if writing the instruments in full."
Since the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Land
Title Abstract and Trust Company v. Dworken, 129 Ohio
State 23, 193 N. E. 650, there have been consent decrees
against title companies in California and in Minnesota; and,
in addition, on December 17, 1935, the Circuit Court of
Dade County, Florida, rendered an opinion and held local
title companies to be in contempt of court for issuing "commercial letters expressing opinions as to the validity or invalidity of the title to real estate * * * where the letters are
not based upon a bona fide application for title insurance."
Late in February the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that it was the practice of law
for a real estate agent not a member of the bar of any court
to secure clients by solicitation and advertisement, to take
leases showing himself as lessor, landlord, and then to conduct
litigation relating to the lease in his own name "merely for the
purpose of collecting money in which he has no interest until
collection thereof."
In a number of recent opinions, the courts have scored in
measured terms the misconduct of attorneys who participate
in, or facilitate, the unauthorized practice ofaaw by laymen.
The most recent, as well as the harshest,- cbmment of this
character is found in Rhode Island Bar Association v. Automobile Service Association (R. I.), 179 A. 139:
"When this arrangement between these lay respondents and the
respondent * * * began to function, not only were they engaged in
the unauthorized practice of law, but * * *, notwithstanding his
license from this court, were practicing law in an illegal manner. It
seems to us this conclusion is inescapable. The conduct of the respondent * * * was inconsistent with the ethics of his profession, though
presumably he did not realize this. He seems to have given little
thought to the nature of his association with these lay respondents,
though he was really permitting them to use his authority as an officer
of this court to furnish the foundation of an enterprise that degraded
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his calling to the level of a common huckstering business. This was
certainly not the standard of conduct to be expected of a member of the
bar of this court. Rather, it was the contrary. As an agent and an
aide of the court in the administration of justice, the true lawyer, conscious of the dignity of his calling, will instinctively avoid such associations, notwithstanding that it may mean the foregoing of a more or
less lucrative source of business. Chief Justice Cardozo, in People v.
Culkin, 248 N. Y. 465, 162 N. E. 487, had this idea in mind when
he expressed himself in the following words: ' "Membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions." Matter Of Rouss, 221 N. Y.
84, 116 N. E. 783. The appellant was received into that ancient
fellowship for something more than private gain. He became an officer
of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court was due,
whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld. He
might be assigned as counsel for the needy, in causes criminal or civil,
serving without pay.' These are not idle words, nor mere rhetoric."

In its decree, later entered in the case, the court said further as to the conduct of the attorney:
"That while the conduct of said respondent * * * in his association with said other respondents was inconsistent with the ethics of
his profession, tending to bring it and himself into degradation and
public contempt, this Court nevertheless feels that his dereliction in the
premises is largely attributable to the inexperience of youth and ignorance of the fundamental relation which should exist between attorney
and client, rather than to any intentional wrongdoing, and that for the
present the unsavory publicity to which he has been subjected as a result
of this proceeding is sufficient punishment, provided, however, he conducts himself blamelessly in the future with respect to said matters and
in a manner becoming a member of the bar of this State."

The procedural methods recently recognized by the
courts will probably do more to eliminate unauthorized practice of law than anything else of recent occurrence.
The first intimation of a more direct method of approaching the problem appeared in Morton v. Beery, decided

November 27, 1933, 39 Ohio L. R. 272.

In that case attor-

neys within its jurisdiction petitioned the court of Common
Pleas of Summit County, Ohio, to order an investigation of
the unauthorized practice of law. The court appointed one
of its own judges to make the investigation. After this judge
had completed his inquiry, appropriate proceedings were
brought against those found to be guilty of unauthorized
practices. Only recently, the Dade County Florida Circuit
Court appointed the members of the Dade County Bar Asso-
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ciation's Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of the Law
a committee of the court on the unauthorized practice of the
law and authorized and empowered it to make inquiry into
and to investigate all unauthorized practices; to subpoena
witnesses to appear before it; to administer oaths to such witnesses; to compel the production of books, records, documents
and data necessary to its security and investigation; and to
suppress all instances of the unlawful practice of law and to
report to the court all violators who refuse to desist, to the
end that the court may administer appropriate discipline.
One of the most sound agencies for the elimination of
unauthorized practice anywhere is the committee established
by rule No. 36 of the Supreme Court of Missouri, which appointed in each judicial circuit of that state a bar committee
to be composed of four lawyers. The court also provided
that "upon application of the chairman of the committee, the
clerk of this court shall issue writs of subpoena, including
subpoena duces tecum and dedimus to take depositions. The
committees are empowered to take and transcribe the evidence
of witnesses who shall be sworn by any person authorized by
law to administer oaths, and the committee shall report to this
court the failure of any person to attend and testify in response to any subpoena issued as herein provided."
These committees were charged with duties both with
respect to professional conduct of attorneys, and, also, "shall
make inquiry from time to time as to the unlawful practice of
law by persons not licensed to do so, and where, in the opinion of the majority of the committee, the facts justify it, to
instigate and prosecute, as representatives of the bar, such
action as may be appropriate to suppress such unlawful
practice."
The direct and immediate responsibility of the Supreme
Court of the state to see to it that all practice of law by unlicensed persons, corporations and associations is eliminated
has been better expressed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in the Automobile Service Company case, already referred to,
than elsewhere. As to the matter, the court said:
"It is our duty to prevent this unfortunate and evil event whenever it threatens. This court is the agent of the people in the administration of justice in this state and has been vested with ample powers to
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vindicate its authority in this department of the people's government.
It would be recreant to the great trust reposed in it if it did not guard
every agency by which justice is administered. To safeguard the practice of the law, which touches so intimately the administration of justice, and to promote the welfare of the people, whose ministers we are,
this court has ordained certain standards of character and education as a
prerequisite to admission to the bar. These standards are high, as indeed
they ought to be, and there is constant pressure to elevate them still
higher, all to the end that the people may be assured the best possible
service in the dispatch of their legal business. None must be permitted
to evade these requirements by doing indirectly what they cannot do
directly."

COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION ANNUAL
MEETING
The 39th annual meeting of The Colorado Bar Association will be held in the Casino of the Stanley Hotel at
Estes Park on September 18 and 19, 1936, the session convening at 1 p. m. on the 18th and ending with the annual
dinner at the hotel at 7:45 p. m. on the 19th.
U. S. Senator David I. Walsh, of Massachusetts, delivers the annual address on Friday evening at 8:30. President
Vidal's address will be on "A Lawyer's Principal Duty."
Other papers will be given by Philip Hornbein, Hudson
Moore, Malcolm Lindsey, Fred Farrar and Erskine R. Myer.
The Association will receive the final report of its Committee on Integration of the Bar and act thereon.
The Stanley Hotel is conducted on the American plan.
Special convention rates are offered its registered guests, to
whom the annual dinner will be presented without additional
charge. To others the cost will be $2 per plate. Bus
service from Denver to Estes Park and return will supply
requisite transportation at P. U. C. rates.
A heavy attendance is anticipated.

